

Panel 3: International media coverage of the Genocide

Introduction

Allan Thompson: Hello, welcome back. We're about to resume, if we could. I'd like to begin the afternoon's session. I just want to take a moment. I'm going to give the floor for a couple of minutes to Mr. Gerry Caplan, who is the head of the Remembering Rwanda commemorative exercise, and Gerry would just like to speak briefly to that, and then I'll have a couple of public service announcements before we move to panel three. Mr. Caplan.

Gerry Caplan: Thank you, Allan. This is wonderfully impressive meeting, and I want to personally congratulate Allan Thompson. I've been in touch with him through the months he's put this together, and one of the things that excites me, I wrote a report for the Organization of African Unity called, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," and it built on the work of most of the people here today, and it's a pleasure to listen to them. It's a pleasure to see them, and to learn from them that this was not a made-in-Rwanda exercise, exclusively. That if it hadn't been for external forces, if it hadn't been for international forces, the genocide might never have happened, and could easily have been prevented. One of our colleagues, Howard Adelman calls it "the most easily preventable genocide imaginable," and we didn't prevent it. And beyond that, once we didn't prevent it, we failed to bother to remember it. And it occurred to me, and to those of us in the field that it was slipping out of public consciousness, and unless we did something dramatically and deliberately, pretty soon the genocide would only be known to Rwandans, and a few remote friends and scholars of Rwanda. So we created an organization called "Remembering Rwanda," with a specific mandate to try and encourage as many people around the world to commemorate and remember the genocide on April 7 of this year, and the African Union passed a resolution accordingly, and the United Nations passed a resolution accordingly, and you'll be surprised to know the Parliament of Canada two weeks ago passed a similar resolution, which Geoff Salat (?) of the Globe did not know about until I told him today, and you can expect it to be a major story on the front page of Monday's Globe.

Many things are being forgotten; one is this was one of the most grotesque incidents of the 20th century. The other is that nobody is remembering the survivors, that no one is paying attention to the victims, that the perpetrators are still getting off scot free, most of them, and above all for my own personal passion, that the international community, the so-called bystanders have not been held accountable. I mean the Catholic Church, and I mean the French government, and I mean the Belgian government, and I mean the Clinton administration, and I mean the Major government in Britain, and one of the things we want to do in the next month is to commemorate these events, and to remember these four components, and above all to say that accountability still must be paid, and we must make those who didn't intervene, those who allowed it to happen, accountable for their sins. Across Canada there will be events from Vancouver, all the way to the Atlantic. I just came back from two days in Nova Scotia, and it will include for your students, Allan, some significant events here in Ottawa. There's a desk outside. The Rwandan community is preparing a series of really interesting events. I urge your students. I urge all of you to get involved. For those outside guests, who have come today, in almost every country you come from, you will find that there are commemoration events. We talk about never again. And the truth is, if we leave it to our governments and our politicians, never again will just a

cliché. It can only be never again if people like us get involved. So I urge you to do so in the next month, and we will remember Rwanda, and make sure the world remembers it. Thank you Allan.

Allan Thompson: Thank you very much for coming back, for being so disciplined. You're almost as disciplined as our panelists. Now we're going to move to basically the other half of the equation that I described this morning, the rest of this dichotomy of the media, beginning with the third panel on the international media coverage of the genocide. Briefly before I forget, and I will remind you of this again before we conclude, immediately following the proceedings, when we close at panel four, there'll be a brief video presentation, then the official part of the event will be over, but we invite you to please follow-up the stairs to the upper foyer. There's a reception that's being hosted there by the Journalists for Human Rights local chapter here at Carleton, and Humura, the Rwandan Community Survivors' Organization. So that reception will be immediately following the closing of the event.

At this time, I would like to call on Jocelyn Coulon, who is the chair of panel number three. Jocelyn is at present with the Pearson Peacekeeping Center, Montreal Campus. Like myself, he worked for 17 years with one of Canada's major newspapers, in his case *Le Devoir*, before he made a career change, and I'm glad he could be here with us today. He doing conference duty this weekend, because yesterday and this morning he was at another event here in Ottawa. So thanks very much, and Jocelyn I'll turn it over to you.

Jocelyn Coulon, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, formerly of Le Devoir: Thank you very much Allan. Do you hear me? Yes okay. I will chair this meeting in French, then people who need to adjust their device, you have a few seconds to do it. So we have up until 3:30 to discuss the topic presented to us today, "International media coverage of the Genocide." I will not introduce the speakers. You have their biographies and their information in the agenda, in the program. So each of these four speakers will have 10 minutes to speak on the topic of interest, and immediately afterwards Gil Courtemanche will ask questions to some of these speakers or to all of the speakers, and immediately afterwards around 3:00 or 3:10, we will go to the question period, which will allow you to ask questions to these speakers. So I would invite Steven Livingston from George Washington University to come up to the mic, and give us his talk. Steven it's all yours.



Steven Livingston, George Washington University

Stephen Livingston: Thank you very much. I will be giving my presentation in English. I first of all come to this with a deep sense of gratitude. This is an excellent conference. I can only echo that again and again. It's also heartening to know that this isn't the only conference that I'm aware of that's going on in North America. I just returned from the far reaches of Pocatello, Idaho. Idaho State University as well has devoted a major conference to this issue, so there is an awareness, a consciousness that continues.

Through some odd sense of good fortune, I happened to find myself in Africa in April-May of

1994. I was in the Sudan trying to understand why the American news media did not pay more attention to that particular humanitarian crisis. At the time, I was spending a lot of time with Donatella Lorch of the New York Times, at that time in the New York Times, Bill Prest (?) of the Christian Science Monitor, and other mostly American correspondents trying to get a sense of how they go about doing what they do. And what I came away from that experience with is a tremendous respect at an individual level for the kinds of hardships and things that correspondents do in the name of bringing us a story. So my remarks if they are to be understood as critical are not directed at individual journalists, but instead it's at, if there's criticism to be given, it's at the nature of the institutions in which they find themselves working.

So with that said, I also encourage all of you, I'm a professor, and I like talking with students and interested members of the community, if there's anything of my talk that you're interested in following up with me on, this is my email address, and I welcome you to contact me if you are so interested.

There are two points, I think, are important for us to keep in mind when talking about media and the international affairs if it's Rwanda, or Bosnia or wherever, and that is that there is a political context, and a media context, and they interact. I'm a political scientist, but I teach something called "Political Communication," which is a direct recognition of the fact that to understand media you have to understand politics, and to understand politics you have to understand the news media. For the political context of Rwanda, I think that one of the places we can turn to most immediately is with the recollection that at this point in time, we were, the United States was in the immediate post-Cold War era, and not quite sure what it's foreign policy objectives were after nearly 50 years of containment theory.

The second point that I'm going to focus on, if nothing else in the background, is the idea that to understand also the media is to understand that institutional basis that I referred to a moment ago. I think among the things that we need to keep in mind is, is that by 1994, you had a handful of corporations owning most of the western news media, and bringing to that enterprise then a set of criteria as to what constituted good journalism, that didn't always necessarily translate into spending the resources and time to cover some distant crisis in Africa. So those are the two things I want to have as the background. I'm going to have to speak quickly here.

I think for us to understand Rwanda, and the American response to Rwanda, the place to begin is in Somalia. I've written several articles about this. I think it's a good idea for us to quickly refresh our memories as to what was going on in Somalia. The United States began an airlift operation in the summer of 1992 that transmogrified, translated itself into a security mission that involved the use of troops by 1992, and then by 1993, with the Clinton administration in power, we have the battle of Mogadishu, the young American Delta operators, special operation forces, whose bodies were put on public display, and this part of the media environment that Americans found themselves awash in by October, 1993. These events in Somalia lead American scholar and statesman, George Kennan, among others, to simply call into question whether the United States was involved in the proper course of foreign policy after the Cold War. I hope that without reading this in English in some sense, the translators can read what I have here on my PowerPoint slide overhead. What Kennan is saying in this slide is essentially writing in the New York Times, that he believes that American intervention in Somalia would

have been unthinkable if it had not been for television coverage that he thinks prepared the American public and Congress or agree to or acquiesce to, an intervention, that in his view, offered no rationale beyond the idea that there was an emotional component to it.

He says that if that's true, then the traditional role of the diplomat and the policy maker is threatened. It's threatened in the sense that foreign policy in the United States or any other country will be directed by the impulsive, emotional content of a rather fickle attention that's paid to some crises and not others by media. That's something that really should be given some thought. At the time that Rwanda was going on, at the time that Somalia was going on, there was the Sudan, there was Afghanistan, there was Angola, there was a long, long list beyond Bosnia of crises that deserved, in their own right, to be paid attention to by all of us. So only some crises at any given point in time are paid attention to. And Kennan's response to that was, "that's dangerous, because it leads to an erratic foreign policy." I'm not saying I agree with that, but I am saying it's the view of the realists, such as Kennan, at the time.

Well, does the CNN effect, understood as this ability to reposition the agenda priorities of the United States government, or any government, does it exist? Through some studies and investigations that I don't have the time to go into, I have concluded as have other scholars and observers that actually it was overstated. Kennan misunderstood and others misunderstood the power of media. First of all, there wasn't that much media attention to Somalia until the Bush administration drew attention to Somalia. And if you're talking about media as a causal agent to policy, you can't have policy makers drawing attention to something, and then blame it on the media. They had it completely backwards. That's my assessment of it. Instead, Somalia must be understood as a result of advocacy that was done by members of Congress in the U.S. aid community, Andrew Natsios among others.

Whether it existed or not, it was assumed to exist. It became almost doctrinaire that something like that exists. I'm halfway through. I have to speak quickly. And this actually had political expression. The General this morning in his talks referred to Presidential Decision Directive 25, which doesn't require, if my civics education still holds, doesn't require Congressional approval, it applies to the executive branch. And so the Clinton administration put into rules the idea that before the United States, on the heels of its experience in Somalia, before the United States would respond to a humanitarian crisis, somewhere among other things, there needed to be a clear demonstration of national interest.

This even extended to the United States actually blocking UN effort to address the growing crisis in Rwanda. Madeline Albright in this particular slide refers to the idea as "folly." It's interesting she would reverse her sentiment a couple of years of later as Secretary of State having to do with Kosovo, but that's another discussion.

There was also beyond this institutional disinclination, there was policy confusion. I had a conference of my own in May, of 1995, where an American general, General Zinni and other generals were in talking about their experience, and I had one general say, "that at the time of the massacres were unfolding, we didn't know, we in the Pentagon didn't know the difference," and I'm quoting, "between the Hutus and the Tutus." That was General Wes Clark, now he was joking, he was joking I assure you, but nonetheless his point was we weren't clear as to who

were the good guys, bad guys to put it in that sort of American frontier terminology.

There was also the military identity protection that was at stake. I had General Shali Kashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say pointedly to me, “we are the Army, not the Salvation Army, and if you’re paying \$1 billion a day for an army, you have certain scenarios that you see them being used in.” There were verbal gymnastics going on in the State Department, where spokespersons were going through all kinds of difficulties. “Do not use the word ‘genocide.’” There were “acts of genocide,” but not “genocide.” So this is the political context. Quickly, too quickly perhaps. Media context: all OJ all the time in the corporate media. Fewer international news stories. If my pointer here is working properly, we can just go right down the line.

Here we have percentage of international news in total media; ABC, CBS and NBC from 1972-1995. You can see in 1974 during Watergate, there were relatively few international news stories, and then there’s this continual increase in attention during a difficult period of the Cold War. By 1990, ’91, you have the war in Iraq, and then there’s this continual diminishment and attention on the part of the American media to international news stories, including in 1994, practically half the attention that had been paid previous years.

Now let’s walk through the spaghetti that you’re looking at right now. General Dallaire actually referred to this. I like to think in my more egotistical moments, I introduced this particular graph back in 1995, and I see it pop up from time to time. What you have, if it will stay, is the shaded area is the attention paid to Rwanda, and then you have a number of others. The diamonds, that’s Haiti. South Africa is at the dark square. You’ve got Bosnia, the cross hatch, and you’ve got OJ Simpson, the American football player. And you can see that in June-July time period, OJ Simpson received more attention that at any point in time did Rwanda or Bosnia. That, along the bottom, you can see some interesting phenomenon here. Let me just point. In May, you can see an increase in amount of attention being paid by the American networks to Rwanda, but the reason for that isn’t directly Rwanda, but rather Nelson Mandela was being elected to the presidency of South Africa. ABC sent two satellite uplink crews there. They diverted one of them to Nairobi to the area, and so for awhile you’ve got ABC driving additional attention. As soon as that satellite uplink left Africa, look what happens to the coverage. Both Mandela’s inauguration, as well as Rwanda, drop from the television screens. One more minute? Thank you sir.

Even if we continue on and look very specifically at the coverage of Rwanda itself, this, what this slide tells us clearly is, is that at least for American television Rwanda wasn’t a story of genocide, Rwanda was a medical story. The lion’s share of coverage comes in July-August, not April, May. What’s July-August, the refugee camps in Zaire. How’s that measured? Look at the datelines. The datelines through Zaire and refugee camps skyrocket. They exceed anything that even came close to being covered during the actual genocide itself. That’s even more true of the presumably omnipotent CNN. Actually CNN, my colleagues, professional journalist friends here, can correct me if I’m wrong, but CNN in Africa at this time, Gary Streiker, one person. That’s CNN.

?: (Inaudible question from unknown speaker)

Steven Livingston: She was flown in. She's a parachuter, right?

Unknown speaker: No she lived in Nairobi.

Steven Livingston: Good, well good journalism. There are, I've got to go, but there are a number of sources that you can turn to if you're interested in this question, and I look forward to talking with you in questions and answers afterwards. Thank you very much for your attention.



Anne Chaon, journalist with Agence France Presse and Africa specialist for the network since 1994

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you very much Steven. I'd now call on Anne Chaon from France Press. She was a correspondent in Rwanda during the genocide. I'd like to call to Anne Chaon, who was there.

Anne Chaon: Since we've been talking about the failure of the press, I would like to be the devil's advocate. We are here in a journalism school. So I would like to explain how we worked as reporters in Rwanda in '94. And by the way, I would like to quote three lines of a report written for the International Press Institute in the year 2000, six years after the genocide, written by Alan Cooperman, who said:

“The media must share the blame for not immediately recognizing the extent of the carnage, and not mobilizing the world attention to it.”

That's my starting point, and we'll try to come back to it. I work out for a press agency, Agence France Press, and starting on April 7, 1994, managed to be present during almost the entire time until the end of the genocide until the end of June, and beyond. One of our first correspondents based in Nairobi, who went immediately to Bujumbura and crossed the borders by car to go to Kigali was Annie Thomas. I asked her to say a few words, and I'll read.

“You asked me if I think about it sometimes. It's much more than that, much more than sometimes. It has become a kind of obsession, because of the event itself, because of the people I met there, victims and killers, because of our inability to describe properly those events during the first few weeks, because of the militia men who with their machetes dripping in blood would come to say how much they loved France. At the beginning, I was in France, I was in Kigali, and I was there, where the President came from in '94. Imagine what Rwanda looked like. I will not explain to Rwandan friends, but for some of you, a few points. There were bombs. There was a civil war. There were hundreds of thousands of people moving on the roads. There were barricades with the drunken militia men, who had machetes and AK 47's, who'd come to get Tutsis, who would ask people for their ID cards, for the press they'd open our cars. They were looking for reporters of Radio France international. Why? Because they spoke French. These militia men didn't listen to the BBC, but to the RFI. If they had found them, this is what they would have done. They also described very simply their position. Hutu majority. Tutsi

minority. That's what we worked on reporting everyday, every hour for radio. That was the case of Mark, and we also had certain permanent broadcast.

So in such a situation you had to try and find your position, and you have two faces. So these three months of genocide from April 7 to the beginning of July when the rebels came into Kigali, we were one of the rare media to speak out. Sometimes we were the only international agency. The BBC also stayed almost all the time. RFI was also present all the time, but very few media were there all the time. Why? Well don't forget because you are future reporters, don't forget that the press is a company. They want to be profitable, and such kind of communication costs a lot of money, especially if you use satellites.

We mentioned the international situation where Rwanda unfolded. There was the siege in Bosnia. There was South Africa, that was organizing its first election. In the United States, they were interested in OJ Simpson. In France we were all concerned by the death of Ayrton Senna the Formula 1 driver. But in April, 1994, the world was more interested in Bosnia than Rwanda. Imagine and remember that the conflict in Bosnia had started in 1992, in ex-Yugoslavia in 1991, that apathy had gained the population. And that's why they weren't interested in Rwanda. Now, would you have wanted the genocide to have lasted two or three years to get as much coverage as in Bosnia? What we saw in France was the same thing as you saw in the United States. There was very little coverage of the genocide. It was the same thing in Le Monde. In all of 1994, there were twice as many articles on Bosnia as in Rwanda in Le Monde.

Now, how did we work? I checked in our morgue, our archives the use of the word "genocide." For weeks, we used terms, such as massacre, killing, ethnic cleansing, chaos, anarchy, murder, serial murder. It's true that journalists are not experts in genocide. It's true that many of them, of which I was one, arrived in Rwanda with very little knowledge about Rwanda, about the country. So we were very tempted, especially at the beginning to speak of the civil war, to treat these massacres as a perverse effect of the return of a civil war, and to link these massacres to the previous massacres since 1959. By refusing, well not refusing, but not understanding that this was something totally new, that this was not a continuity of massacres, but something new. The first time we used the term "genocide" was April 20 by quoting Human Rights Watch. In the weeks that followed, the word "genocide" was used by the agency only when we could put it in quotes, and by quoting another source. Thanks to Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontières and others, the reality of the genocide arrived in the press, no thanks to the reporters, but thanks to the NGOs. They're the ones who really opened the door, and we have them to thank. We probably avoided many errors because of these NGOs. So the word "genocide" will become a word that we will use starting on May 25, almost two months afterwards when the Human Rights Commission of the UN finally adopted a resolution to adopt the use of the term genocide to describe the situation in Rwanda. So between April 6 and May 25.

Now retrospectively, we can see our mistake, but the press in France, maybe it's the same elsewhere in the world, continued to be under the syndrome Timisoara. Romania 1989. The discovery of mass graves. "Mass graves" became a forbidden term for years. There were no mass graves. These were the "communal" graves from the neighboring hospital. We made that mistake that time, and the editors in chief with good reason were traumatized by that mistake, so

we became too careful, with the language we used. We were afraid to use the word “mass graves,” and that is why in Rwanda, we did not use the term “genocide.” In Kosovo, we used the term of “genocide,” and in East Timor, of course, there were terrible murders, terrible massacres, but it wasn’t genocide. So, we afraid of making the same mistake in Rwanda as had happened in Timisoara.

Press is a work in progress. Things change every day. Yes were we too timid, too afraid, but the mistakes continued. In June, the French press became involved en masse in June in Operation Turquoise, and was given the opportunity to access to many zones that were previously restricted, areas where atrocious massacres had occurred, but there again there was too much information. The military landing, the “humanitarian operation,” and in mid July one million Hutus went to Zaire and cholera exploded in the camps. The humanitarian catastrophe overwhelmed the real story of the genocide.

During the spring of 1994, and this is a basic fact to remember, those who wanted to know, knew, details arrived late, I know, but who wanted to know, knew. Reporters were there, not all the time for most of them, but the witnesses came from the country. Agence France Press was always there. BBC was there. Reporters in the field showed their determination they wanted to report, to give a witness of this killing.

So if I had to answer Kuperman, I would say today, “yes we missed the Rwanda genocide, of course we did, but you wrote in 2000 we were writing in 1994. Journalists are not sociologists or historians. History is woven daily before their eyes. Please a bit of indulgence for the reporters.”

Now, reporters were there. Pictures were available. Texts were available. If your reader, if the people you speak to do not want to listen to your story you can’t force them to. They just have to turn the button of the BBC, and the editors can refuse to accept your reports. It’s up to them to decide whether to use it or not. General Dallaire, you gave a terrific interview to TFN, the very popular French agency. It was broadcast in prime time. For such a channel, it was very courageous. I’m sorry for your troubles. I was very chagrined. The number of people listening went down. . If you don’t want to listen, you shut out, you shut your ears. That’s what happened in Rwanda. In 1994 the information was available. We say, “oh it’s the fault of the United States that didn’t want to intervene. It’s the fault of the government of France.” But you the public could have done something. When I came in from Rwanda in the summer ’94, I went to my little village in eastern France, and the fisherman said, “Oh were you there? Well, don’t talk about it any more. We’ve had enough. We see these terrible pictures at 8:00 p.m. at the time when we’re eating, but what can we do? We can’t do anything.” And I never spoke to anyone about Rwanda, not until when the International Tribunal called on me three years later to ask me for details. So then I understood that in the meantime, nobody else had wanted to hear from me, and I had forced nobody to listen. Thank you.

Mark Doyle, BBC correspondent who reported from Rwanda during much of the genocide

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you very much, Anne. Thank you very much for having respected your 10-minute briefing time. You know I've been in journalism for 20 years, very often in war zones, and in international affairs. I agree with what you've just said. So I would now call upon Mark Doyle to give us his talk. You'll do it from there?

Mark Doyle: I'm feel more comfortable sitting talking to this microphone at the tables. In late April, 1994, when I was in Kigali, I was doing a question and answer session with a BBC presenter in London, and the presenter asked me to clarify what all this shooting and killing was about. I found myself saying, "look you have to understand that there are two wars going on here. There's a shooting war and a genocide war. The two are connected, but also distinct. In the shooting war, there are two conventional armies at each other, and in the genocide war, one of those armies, the government side with help from civilians, is involved in mass killings." Now I know that's very simplistic, but I think it's a useful way of understanding what happened.

My first insight into what was going on in Rwanda came in February, 1994, when I had an off the record briefly from an African ambassador in Kigali. I can't tell you which one it was, of course, because it was off the record. The ambassador astonished me with his frankness. He explained in detail how the various extremist Hutus parties were blocking the installation of the power sharing government. And he also astonished me by keeping me there in his private office for four hours. I didn't even have an appointment with him. I was a bit embarrassed, and I kept looking at my watch, but he kept on saying, "sit down Mark. You have to understand. I want the BBC to understand what's happening. Do you understand now how dangerous this situation is?" When I left his office, the ambassador said, "don't forget Rwanda Mark. A big story could happen here."

I was in Nairobi when I get a call from the BBC late in the evening of April 6. A plane had come down, and I remember with crystal clarity what I said. "Oh my God," I told the editor on the other end of the phone line, remembering clearly the ambassador's warning. "Oh my God this is going to be a huge story!" The next day, the machinery got into motion. Colleagues from Reuters news agency chartered a plane from Nairobi to Mbarara in southern Uganda, and I bought a seat. Kigali Airport was shut, of course, and this was the best way, I thought, of getting some angle on the story. It took most of the day to get to Mbarara, and most of the next day to get to Kabale on the Uganda/Rwanda border, and awhile to negotiate entry into the RPF-held zone to meet with Paul Kigame at the old tea estate in Melindi. I stayed for a couple of days near Melindi, and saw the starting of the shooting war. The RPF lines just north of Byumba, and the government lines on the outskirts of that town. And when it became clear from what I saw around Byumba, that the shooting war had restarted, I decided I had to try and get to Kigali. There was no way I could get through those front lines. So I drove back north. I took a risk I drove through the night, which is against my normal rule in Africa. I never drive at night, and I drove to Entebbe Airport. By an extraordinary fluke, a few journalists and myself met an aid worker at the airport, who had a plane, which was going to fly to Kigali. It was half empty except for some food supplies, and he agreed to give us a lift.

The scene at Kigali Airport was quite extraordinary when we arrived there. The shooting war

was clearly in full flight. We could hear constant small arms and mortar fire. At night we could see tracers, and hear explosions. On the apron of the airfield, there were numerous French, Italian and Belgian military planes disgorging European paratroopers, who had come to save European lives.

I spent a few nights sleeping in the airport, eating French military rations, which are by the way infinitely superior to any other military rations, and by day I went with the French as they drove into town to rescue the French citizens, not because I thought that rescuing Europeans was the main story, but because it was the only way that I could get into town with any sort of security. I hadn't made contact with the UN people at that point. The shooting was going on everywhere. I distinctly remember one time when normally the sound of small arms is the occasional crack and whip, so you crack whip, crack whip like that, but there so were so many small arms going off there, that there was a deafening wall of sound that went on for hours and hours just from the small arms fire, which was then sometimes supplemented by mortars, and other things, rockets.

The other war, the genocide war, was also getting underway. When I was with the French military, going to rescue some white people, I saw a Rwandan man, sitting in the back of a truck attacking another with a screwdriver. Colleagues at the other end of the convoy of military lorries saw people being attacked with machetes. The French soldiers just drove straight past heading for the house of the European they wanted to rescue.

After the front lines began to stabilize a bit, I left the airport and ventured into town. My first stop was the Mille Collines hotel. The place was full of Tutsis in hiding, with militias trying to get inside to kill them. I managed to get a share of a room at the hotel, and I decided foolishly, in retrospect, to try to go to the Red Cross Hospital. If I knew then what I now know, I wouldn't have done it, because it was a ridiculously dangerous thing to do without a military escort, but I suppose I'm pleased that I did venture out, because I discovered the genocide war on that day, for myself. There were about six roadblocks between the Mille Collines and the Red Cross. There were a relatively small number of bodies, I know that sounds horribly callous, but in the Rwandan context, it's a fair comment, a relatively small number of bodies at each of these roadblocks. With some bluffing, I managed with my friend and colleagues from CNN, Katherine Bond (?), to get to the hospital, and on the way back from the hospital to the hotel about two hours later, the piles of bodies at the roadblocks had grown. For the first time, I had personal, eyewitness evidence that pro-government militias were killing people in large numbers. There's no doubt about it. I remember Katherine turning to me and saying that we should describe that road between the Mille Collines and the Red Cross as "Machete Avenue." "If they can have Sniper Alley in Sarajevo," she said, "we can have Machete Avenue in Kigali." And from then on, I started to use the word "genocide." The transcripts of my radio dispatchers say that I used the word first on April 19, quoting the British aid agency Oxfam. In the early days, I was guilty of misinterpreting the situation. I spoke of chaos and indiscriminate killings, but gradually I learned with my own eyes that it was not chaotic, and it was far from indiscriminate. I learned to distinguish between the shooting war and the genocide war.

It was after trips like my ride down Machete Avenue that I sometimes found conversations with the news desks in London very difficult. They'd often say, "great stuff Mark, but don't forget to report the other side," or, "let's keep objective about this." I don't blame them, and this was the

usual stuff of private chats between editors and correspondents. At no point, however, was I censored or told what to say. I don't think that those editors were seeking some kind of political, moral equivalents. It's just that they, like so many others could not take on board the enormity of what was happening. I sometimes barely believed it myself, even though I'd seen it. I told the news desks in London with my blood boiling internally at the implication that I was biased, that the mass killing was being overwhelmingly done by one side, that it generally did stop when the RPF arrived, and after awhile it was clear that irrespective of what one thought of the RPF, and I didn't and don't hold any grief for them, an RPF military victory was probably necessary if the killing was to stop. These were highly unusual things for a BBC reporter to say.

General Dallaire was quite friendly with the press, but at the same time, he used the press, and as he openly said this, we didn't mind, because if he was going to visit Kigame or Bagosora or one of the other people with a journalist in tow, it helped him, because he could get them to yes we agree to this or that cease fire agreement, but it helped us, because it meant we could interview those people.

However, on one occasion, I deeply regretted traveling with Dallaire. We went across the front line to meet the government side in the Mille Collines Hotel, and after he had had his talk with the government, the press were invited in to film the handshake, or something like that. At this point, a senior gendarmerie officer started berating the press, especially the BBC, for spending too much time with the RPF. Let's be clear. There were very good reasons why we spent time with the RPF, because the RPF were winning the shooting war, and the positions on the other side kept on moving backwards. So it wasn't a great place to be. That's one, and two of course, the genocide was taking place on that side, and it was very, very dangerous. Anyway, when this officer spoke, some misplaced pride told me that I should put my hand up, and say, "I would be very happy to go with you to your side of the front lines," and I regretted it almost as soon as I'd opened my mouth. But anyway, I set off on a tour of government positions, and around the part of Kigali called Nyamirambo. It was very, very dangerous, and I knew that there were RPF positions in the hill above, and at one point a mortar round landed quite near to us. However, on the other hand, I did learn two important things that day; one the killing was continuing. I saw a well full of bodies, and two, that the government military and the militia were working directly hand in hand, because I saw them doing it. I saw them giving orders to each other. It was direct collaboration, and I managed to see it with my own eyes, but it was a dangerous thing to do, but at least I got that information.

My last trip outside Kigali before leaving Rwanda in July, 1994, was a journey I drove myself to the town of Gisenyi. That's on the border of the then Zaire. The RPF had claimed to have taken the town, and since it would be the last major town to fall to them, meaning they would have won the shooting war, I decided to go and check. There was a petrol tanker on fire at a crossroads in Gisenyi, and I met a tall RPF officer called Bruce Munyango. Someone had told him I was coming, and he greeted me. He had one finger missing on his right hand. "I'm going to take you right up to the border," he said, "to show you that we're in control." He did. The RPF had won the shooting war, but it didn't feel like a triumph, because the other side had almost won the genocide war.

Linda Melvern, investigative journalist, formerly at the Sunday Times and author of “A People Betrayed”

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you very much, Mark, for this first presentation. In a panel, you're doing so well. You should do it often. I mean that was great. I would like to invite now Linda Melvern to address us.

Linda Melvern: Thank you so much for inviting me to speak at a school of journalism. I'm an investigative journalist, and for 10 years, I have concentrated on the exact circumstances of the genocide in Rwanda. The events in Rwanda in '94 were defined for our generation, the consequences of the failure of intervene in the face of mass murder, and there remains little doubt that what took place, the failure to predict it, to prevent it, and then to stop it is one of the greatest scandals of the last century.

One of the great sadnesses is that it is an enormous failure of the profession of journalism. First in failing to adequately report what was happening, and the first international inquiry into the genocide determined that this contributed to what happened, and I do think the time has come to seriously question our news values.

Initially, what western press coverage there was on Rwanda, instead of identifying the killing as the result of a planned and well-organized campaign, described tribal blood letting that foreigners were powerless to prevent. This was dangerous. It bolsters the arguments that only a massive and dramatic intervention would succeed, and this was out of the question. The crucial issue of providing Dallaire's beleaguered force with either supplies or reinforcements to continue to try to save people was simply not taken up as an issue. No one knew what the choices were, or the risks, because the Security Council meetings to decide UN policy were held in secret.

On April 28, the Oxfam Agency determined that a genocide was taking place in Rwanda, and issued a press release. That story merited 10 paragraphs on an inside page of The Guardian. An editorial some days later declared, “there is precious little that the international community can do to stem the fighting in Rwanda at this stage.”

In April, the journalist, Aidan Hartley was sent to Rwanda by the Reuters News Agency from Nairobi to cover the evacuation of foreigners, and he remembers being told by his editors that this is your classic “bongo” story. There would be no interest in what was happening in Rwanda unless they start raping white nuns. Hartley was told that his job was to cover the whites, and get the nuns evacuated, and that would be the end of it. Everyone knew that small wars in small states in Africa were less likely than ever to get coverage after what happened in Somalia. The message then was quite clear to the genocidaires.

I was in New York in April, 1994. I had written a 50-year history of the UN that was being filmed by Channel 4 television, and in early May, I conducted an interview that I have never forgotten, and it is with me still. I interviewed one of the non-permanent representatives on the Security Council for the Czech Republic. His name was Karel Kovanda, and he said to me that he learned more about what was happening in Rwanda from human rights groups, from particularly Alison Des Forges, than from sitting in the secret and informal meetings of the

Security Council to decide what to do. Eventually, a contact at the UN leaked to me an account of what had been said in these secret Council meetings, and this extraordinary document, which is now lodged in an archive at the University of Wales, proves that in the first three weeks of mass slaughter that fact was not discussed in the Security Council. The whole focus was civil war, and what to do about evacuating the peacekeepers.

You will now hear the U.S., Madeline Albright's memoirs, and the U.K., our own ambassador, claim that they did not know what was happening. This I have disproved in my latest book.

While the UN in an extraordinary and unprecedented move, opened its archives to me, the U.K, and the U.S., and France still, their policies are hidden in secrecy. It is incredible to me that the French ambassador, from a country intimately involved in an extremist government that plotted, and then carried out a genocide, sat in silence. I have a document in my archives that shows how French military officers were embedded in the Rwandan army.

The last chapter in my book I call "The Silence." The obligation of states towards genocide prevention is outlined in the 1948 convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a legally binding treaty. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the U.K., the U.S., could have taken action in accordance with the convention. They chose not to do so. They undermined international law of Rwanda, and made a mockery of the convention. I will say this to you as journalists. I have worked for 10 years on this story, and there is a ton of material that we still need. We still need to know how the policies were made in France and the U.K. and in the U.S., and we're a long way from that even today. Thank you.



Question Period

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you Linda also for that testimony. It's very moving. Now I would like to give the floor to Gil Courtemanche, a journalist and a novelist, who is well known, not just in Quebec and in Canada, but also around the world. We'll begin this discussion therefore by asking a certain number of questions to our panelists. Mr. Courtemanche, you have the floor.

Gil Courtemanche, author of "A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali": If I may, could I make one or two comments, not questions just to start? Two weeks ago, I was Mali for a literary festival. Oh yes, there are literary festivals in Africa, and when I was there, I spoke in a number of secondary schools and colleges about the genocide, of course, in Rwanda, and each school, and I guess really what I'm going to say summarized the contribution we just heard. The first question from an African student was how can you explain this tribal war 10 years afterwards in Africa? With all the information that had been given to the Africans, all the information which had been given to them, still causes them to refer to it as a tribal war.

The second comment: there's something unique about the genocide in Rwanda, and for those people who think this can never happen again, it should make them think. In history, it's the only genocide which we actually saw taking place. We actually saw it taking place. We could say that we didn't know what happened in Auschwitz. We can claim that we didn't know was

going in fact, in the case of the Killing Fields, but nobody, nobody as from April 7, 1994, nobody can claim that they didn't actually see the genocide taking place in Rwanda, and it still took place. It still went on. I'd like to ask this question to Steve Livingston.

As we see in every intervention, the use of word "genocide" is like the key to a lot of things, and especially in the United States, big efforts have been made not to use that word. If the word had been used in the United States, do you think it would have changed something?

Steven Livingston: I wasn't there.

Gil Courtemanche: No I know.

Steven Livingston: My understanding is, is that, had the State Department, for instance, in it's pronouncements, used the word "genocide" calling the events in Rwanda a genocide, it would have implied American recognition of the fact, and as signators to various international treaties, it would have obligated the United States to respond in kind. So that fact, as I understand it, gave rise to some strange theatre that occurred at State Department press briefings, where the spokesperson would use words, such as we recognize that "acts of genocide have occurred," but studiously avoid actually invoking the term in a direct manner. Simply to avoid the obligations that would have ensued had she done that. So yes, that's the best that I'm in a position of answering the question at this point.

Gil Courtemanche: At one point in time in the media, was the word "genocide" used according to your research?

Steven Livingston: It began to be used, well, March-April 19, 1994. Right and actually ABC News during that period of time when that crew was diverted to the Rwanda story, away from Nelson Mandela's inauguration. It must be said, it escapes me exactly who the ABC reporter was, but he did a very good job, and he actually began to understand. He went beyond the typical news frame of ancient ethnic hatreds, tribal warfare, and started to get to the heart of the story relatively early on, at least in the context of American network coverage. So it began earlier in the news media. As a matter of fact, if I might add, there was quite a bit of tension found between the American press corps and the State Department, because the American press corps saw exactly, and called the State Department, on it's attempts to obfuscate the issues at hand.

Gil Courtemanche: I have a question for Anne Chaon also. We know the French government, how closely linked it was, maybe even more than that. I'm trying to find the right word, perhaps incestuously linked to the regime there in Rwanda. There was this operation therefore which took place, which in the first few days was presented as being a magnificent humanitarian operation. You saw that the country was intervening. So the French media, how did they report this in the beginning? I remember myself, it looked like a great moment of glory, a great example of French compassion. The only country which dared to intervene where the international community refused to intervene. And now, we know what the purpose of the operation really was.

Anne Chaon: Oh it's even worse than that. When you say you know to what degree France was involved with the Hutu regime there, unfortunately, we still don't know yet to what degree they were involved. It goes probably even beyond that, probably even beyond that, beyond what has been written to press to date. In France, on April 5, Patrick de Saint-Exupery, who was a Figaro reporter, testified in at Arusha, at the trial of the Kibuye Prefecture. He worked a great deal on the presence of France in Rwanda, and he ended up in Kibuye. There he met a French soldier there, who put on a Rwandan battle jacket, battle dress. Given the carnage there he absolutely collapsed. He burst into tears, and said, "we were the ones who trained them." So this link was for a very long time, and it continued in '94. The book is called, *l'Inavouable*, by Patrick de Saint-Exupery and if you read that, you will read some absolutely dreadful things about the French presence in Rwanda with this regime, but it's even more strange than that. Once the possibility of military operation was stated, then everyone was very surprised. They didn't know what to do. General Dallaire was there with just a few men, a dreadful situation, and the idea that finally someone was going to send troops there, and a few bags of rice, well that was good news. But the French press was very suspicious about this.

The first reports on negotiations in the Security Council about how they were going to implement Operation Turquoise were accompanied by enormous suspicion. What were they going to do there? We'd been there since 1990. We hadn't moved. What will we do there? Unfortunately, over a few weeks, this became, as I said really a field of glory, if you will, for the French army. The landing, if you will, of a French contingent in Rwanda, which was welcomed by the genocidaires, if you will, who had the tricolour flag in one hand and a machete in the other. And this was noted, this was reported. And then the French came. They protected a small group of people, who were trying to escape in the southwest, a dreadful situation. Then they started to set up country hospitals, and treat mutilated babies. So this operation, which could have started off very poorly, ended very well for France. So it was the opposite trend, if you will.

Gil Courtemanche: Mark, you said you came into Rwanda via Byumba. So surely you were in contact with people from the RPF before coming into Rwanda.

Mark Doyle: Yeah surely, yeah.

Gil Courtemanche: What was at the beginning there, their line for journalists? What were they saying about what was happening in Kigali?

Mark Doyle: Their line was that mass killing had begun, and so they had to move forward to stop it. I have to say the RPF were very effective at manipulating journalists. Usually because they told the truth, actually. Kigame said something, of course, we reported it saying, "Kigame claims," if we didn't know ourselves, but a few days later when you had gone to the place that you said they had taken, almost invariably they had taken it. So there was more trust with what they said, because we gradually could prove that what they were saying was correct, not their political line, but whether they had taken town X or town Y. So in that sense, they certainly had a better reputation amongst journalists for sort of telling the truth. Of course, they had a political line, and they were doing their propaganda, and lying as well about other things than the government side. But that was what they said. "The killing has started on a massive scale.

We've got to go and stop it.”

Gil Courtemanche: But did they try to explain to you that there was first this coup d'état, because most of the people, who were murdered in the first days were moderate Hutus, and politician Tutsis, and businessmen. And then a planned genocide, would they give you information like that, or just speaking about large scale massacres?

Mark Doyle: Well I mean I'll have to say you know some of these questions that people ask, and some of the scenarios that people paint about the reality of the sort of things that Ad (?) and I was doing, I mean the idea that we were sitting down, debating with the RPF you know what sort of coup d'état it had been. It had taken us 48 hours to get to a place, where a hell of a lot of hot lead was flying through the air, and the RPF put us in an African hut with guards, and then finally they you, know they said, “Okay, we're taking you to the front line now.” The idea that we sat down with Emmanuel Ndahiro and debated things, you know it just wasn't like that. It was grabbing what you could, when it was safe to grab it, and then fighting with your satellite phone to make it work, and try and send a story that approximated the truth. So that's the honest answer to your question.

Jocelyn Coulon: Gil, let's move onto now the questions from the floor, if you don't mind. We've got about 25 minutes left, 20 minutes really, if we're going to stick to our timetable. So please don't make introductory statements. Please don't make political statements. Please just ask your question directly. Please.

Unknown questionner: You don't know how happy I am to be at this end of a mike with the journalists. During the first days of the Rwandan genocide, I was interviewed frequently by the press, and in that time, I was told point blank that by one person, who was particularly honest with me, who said, “I cannot say what you're telling me. I cannot say that this is not a tribal war, and that this is organized by the state. My editor will not accept it. I'm interested in the way in which media concentration in a free press means that you can't have a dissenting opinion.

Jocelyn Coulon: Who wants to take this one? Mark.

Mark Doyle: I don't recognize that at all. My editors have never told me what to say. When I started using the word “genocide” they said, “Are you sure? Can we use that word, because Butros Gali says you can't.” I said, “I don't care what he says,” and I just don't recognize that at all. That's not the way the BBC works. I don't know if that's the way newspapers work or news agencies, but ...

Steven Livingston: I guess I'm the closest there is to an American journalist here. The corporate media in the United States means that certain kinds of stories are given preference, stories that are dramatic, but it doesn't translate into editors telling a reporter what he or she can or cannot say.

Jocelyn Coulon: Madam.

Unknown questionner: My question is for Mr. Doyle and Mme Chaon. This morning we tried

to understand the moment where a journalist becomes a criminal. I think the question that comes to my mind this afternoon is when does a journalist become a witness? Because I think witnesses you did become, obviously to a genocide. And then how do you then live as a witness, who needs a public to hear their testimonial, the fact that as Mme Chaon explained, people said we just couldn't bare to watch that. We were turning our television channel, or that people were not listening to Mr. Dallaire, because it was too hard to watch. How do you as journalists, and perhaps what could you say to the young journalists here today, experience as journalists become witnesses, this inability of the public to hear what you have to say.

Anne Chaon: I feel sorry, but I don't care.

Jocelyn Coulon: Any other reaction? No. Go ahead Mark.

Mark Doyle: You have to find ways of telling the story that people will listen to. I mean you have to find an angle, which someone like my mum sitting in London, you know, will care about. You have to find a way of telling the story and being a witness in an effective way. It's all very well being an expert on Rwanda, and wittering on for 15 minutes, you know, if people turn the radio off, there's no point in doing it. So you have to find, I mean I hesitate to say it, but I mean, you have to find a sexy angle to the story to make it work. That is what you have to do.

Anne Chaon: Well, the sexyness angle is not always there everyday.

Mark Doyle: Indeed, I mean the story in Rwanda sold itself.

Anne Chaon: I'm a little wrong when I tell you I feel sorry, but I don't care. But it's really the truth, I feel deeply sorry. You know it's unbearable sometimes. Why don't you care? You cannot imagine in what mess people are living, but so what? Do I have to stop working? Do I have to stop reporting, because nobody wants to hear around me, or because a newspaper won't pick up my stories, some won't, some will? That's it.

Jocelyn Coulon: Merci. Lina (?).

Lina Algin (?): Hello I'm Lina Algin (?) I work for Oxfam Quebec. So my question is for Mark. Sorry I will start again, what was the relationship between journalists and humanitarian NGOs doing some months after the genocide? What is the relationship now when humanitarian crises happen with these humanitarian NGOs, and what should it be, the relationship between journalists and these organizations? And I have a second short question. We've been talking about how to make you as journalists to make your editor buy your story, because there are a lot of journalists working very hard in the field to have the stories. You mentioned that, but how to make these editors buy your story? Is there a chance to change that? For instance, Congo be part of the news today, to make Columbia be part of the news today?

Jocelyn Coulon: Is the question addressed to Mark? Anne?

Mark Doyle: What was relationship during the genocide between journalists and the NGOs was quite simple, because all the NGOs ran away. So there weren't any. There was no relationship

really. I mean the international committee of the Red Cross was still there doing extremely good work. Local Rwandans, who had not been killed, were continuing to try and help the churches, but in terms of international NGO, expatriate personnel, there were hardly any. There were two staying with General Dallaire and I. I slept on the floor with them. I don't mean slept with them. There were two quite brave guys, who stayed behind. So there wasn't really a relationship with NGOs.

And how should journalists deal with NGOs? I always feel if I'm interviewing an NGO, then I've failed to get the proper story, because interviewing an NGO is the easiest possible thing in the world, and I don't want to have white people on the television when I'm doing a story about Africa. It's admission of failure in my view.

How do you get the editors to buy the story? You write it very, very well.

Jocelyn Coulon: Anne, would you like to explain something?

Anne Chaon: Well, its awful. You're still working in a freedom of expression context. Through Agence Press, what we try and do is give them information, photos, text, so provide different angles, stories, reports, analyses, summaries of the events. And then they do with it what they want to do. They can use them, but we've no control over where they use them, and there's no map of having of any control. It's up to them, as Mark say, the better the quality of the evidence, of the stories, then there's a chance it might be picked up by somebody else. That's all you can do.

Jocelyn Coulon: Excuse me, I'd like to come back to this relationship about the NGOs and the media.

General Dallaire: A million and so on Rwandans went through Goma, and had the military with them, and the Interahamwe and so on. The press ran to Goma, and as Anne said, abandoned the genocide. The genocide was of no interest any more, although the killing was still going on certain areas, they ran to Goma, and Goma was over aid. They were dying by the hundreds in different camps throughout southern Rwanda, but nobody cared about that. It was the Goma. All the big nations were there. The wife of the Vice President of the United States was there, and so the press maneuvered in the hands of the humanitarians. And why? Is the humanitarians need the press, because they're there helping at that time, but they know there's another crisis coming, and so they need the press to bring out those stories and pictures so they can use them to get money in order to rebuild their funds for the next catastrophe. So there is an intimacy between particularly the big NGOs and the press in regards to, unwillingly make the case sometimes worse, and in the case of Goma over aid Goma, and totally abandon the over 2 million that I had still in southern Rwanda.

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you General. So ...

Anne Chaon: If I could make just a point about Goma. General you're right. Everybody ran to Goma, and why? Because it was so easy to cover. After months of genocide, the issue of who is good, who is bad disappeared completely. The evil was the cholera, but no political issue arose

with cholera in the camps. It was much more comfortable for everybody to cover cholera than genocide.

Jocelyn Coulon: So, this lady here.

Unknown questioner: For someone from Rwanda, we're got two communities of journalists, local journalists and international journalists, and for cultural or financial reasons, these groups are never together, these two groups. The local journalists tend to cover things too closely, and the international journalists, who don't know what's going on, in fact. This morning we talked about the hate media. This afternoon we're talking about foreign journalists. I'd like to talk about something else, a possible relationship, if there was or not, if you met people from Kangura, from the RTL, because we see at the present time in 2004, when they seen the international journalists in there, local journalists in the small bars, or when they're just sitting on a case of beer, and this also shows the coverage done by local journalists, and also by international journalists. So I'd like know actually what happened in 1994, maybe Anne or Mark, maybe you could tell us about that?

Mark Doyle: At the time, Thomas who is the BBC French services correspondent was hiding in a hotel, and I didn't know. So I mean there was absolutely no connection between me and the local correspondents at all. It's the first time we've met, and most of the local other journalists had either been killed or were very sensibly keeping their heads down. But I mean that was a very, very unusual example. If you want to ask in general, in general I have an extremely good relationship with all of the local BBC correspondents. I've come to trust many of them with my life, and they also rely on me in other ways. I can sometimes be useful. I have a pocket full of money usually, and it's a symbiotic relationship. But, I don't really recognize the picture that you're painting there of, you know the western journalists are sitting drinking, I do drink in a hotel, but sitting in a hotel, and well you know the poor Africans are scrambling around in the mud. I mean that's not what happens. I mean our BBC correspondents are extremely professional people, who are paid properly. I totally respect them, and I always spend as much time as I possibly can with them. I don't recognize the picture you're painting at all.

Jocelyn Coulon: Maybe Anne will say something.

Anne Chaon: But I've met them really, a team of RTL, which at the were time were in Gisenyi in the far west of the country, following the move by the government, and Veruggio (?), who wasn't very chatty, however. This was in the last 2 days, so things were collapsing then. It was over. They went into the meridian. There was no contact, but Valerie, I think it was Valerie, who was there to explain that there was still a chance of reconquest. So that was the only time when I saw them, and as Mark said, our Rwandan colleagues during the genocide. But in Africa today, of course, we see them now.

Jocelyne Coulon: So the last two questions if we could, because we want to stick to the timetable.

Unknown questioner: I want to direct my question to Mark and Anne, and as a foreign practitioner, I want to highlight two challenges we are facing; number one is the failure to

recognize the severity, the nature and the intensity of the persecution Falun Gong in terms of their genocidal campaign in China, and due to the, not only, in the physical dimension, but also in the spiritual dimension as well due to the hate propaganda and the covering up, and the second challenge of Falun Gong is the state hate media propaganda in China, as well as extension to overseas. My question is as a reporter in the international media, how can we know to balance the report, to stop, disseminate state hate propaganda from Chinese media, as well as to make breakthrough to report reality of the nature of this persecution? Thank you.

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you sir, but this question was addressed this morning if I understand, and we are talking about Rwanda right now. Then I will ask the lady to ask her question. I'm sorry for that.

Jennifer (unknown last name): Hello, my name is Jennifer, and I'm a student here at Carleton. My question is a little bit broad, and it's for everyone on the panel. All day today I think we've been deciding the onus of the problem in Rwanda, the lack of international support had a lot to do with the lack of media coverage, and the lack of participation with the U.S., and other western countries. My question to you is, we have all these boundaries when coming up with a new situation like the genocide in Rwanda, languages we don't understand like General Dallaire was saying, cultures we don't understand. Is there any way that you can think of to overcome these boundaries, as like new journalists, and changing the system so that maybe the media is not so corporately involved?

Jocelyn Coulon: Who wants to take this one? Linda?

Linda Melvern: When it came to Rwanda, I think there was a complete lack of understanding of what was going on. There was a peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, and whether or not that peace agreement was realistic will be a debate for years and years to come. But I know this. That what we expected Rwanda to do, achieve a power sharing, democratic government in two years has taken a place like northern Ireland, which is similar, decades to achieve. And I don't think that one could have reported Rwanda at the time without taking that into account. The other thing to remember is that genocide was already present in April, 1994. I have studied a place called Gikondo quite closely, which is a part of Kigali, and in that area 150 Tutsi went to sleep elsewhere, in churches and in UN-protected sites before the genocide even began. So it was a complete failure to understand Rwanda before the genocide, as well as afterwards.

Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you Linda. The very last question please.

Unknown questioner: Thanks. My question is, I think, mainly for Mark and for Steven. It relates to the political impact that you feel that British journalism, print and electronic had on political processes in the U.K. So, for example, on April 19 when you first used the word "genocide" electronically, was there an increase in the frequency or intensity of opposition and questioning in the House of Commons, House of Lords, or was there another form of political response that resulted, you feel, from the coverage that you and others were provided.

Jocelyn Coulon: Okay, thank you. Very short answer Mark.

Mark Doyle: The short answer is I'm afraid I don't know, because I wasn't in London at time, but I strongly suspect that they didn't discuss Rwanda at all in the House of Commons. However, that's not to say that we don't have a influence. I'm convinced that the work that I did in Sierra Leone and the appalling things that were happening there was at least in some tiny way instrumental in the intervention of the British army, which helped bolster the UN force in Sierra Leone, and save the country from very bad fate.

Jocelyn Coulon: Steven?

Steven Livingston: I think Mark's answered.

Jocelyn Coulon: Okay Linda?

Linda Melvern: At the end of the April in the Security Council, there was an eighthour debate about whether or not to use the word "genocide." Eight hour debate, and during that debate, the British ambassador, Sir David Hannay, said that if the Council used the word "genocide" they would be a laughing stock, and it was only when the New Zealand president of the Council suggested that they go into public session that a compromise was reached. This is not the way the Security Council was intended to operate. The Security Council was intended to operate in open session, with decisions openly arrived at. And there's something else that is very serious about what happened in the U.K. On May 9 in the House of Commons, MPs were told that 200,000 people may have died in Rwanda in a civil war. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that Parliament was misled. I have tried to cover this story, and I have been threatened with the Official Secrets Act, which is why I say there is so much more to find out. Thank you.

Jocelyn Coulon: Steven, very shortly please.

Steven Livingston: Well, the last slide that I didn't get to has to do with, in some sense, whether or not Mark is correct to say that media, international media can serve as an indicator, an early warning device for genocide. Generally speaking, I don't think that that works that way, because too often media are reactive after the fact, too far into the circumstance. There are developments that are changing that. The greater mobility that media have today than they did in 1994 I think though gives us some hope that that may be changing.

Jocelyn: Well thank you very much. I think you will join me to congratulate our speakers and Gil Courtemanche.

Allan Thompson: I have a couple of very important announcements while I have your attention. First of all, if all of our panelists, chairs and discussants could please either remain at the front of the room, or come to the front of the room. I think this is the one moment when we're all here, and I would like to ask our student volunteers to bring you a gift. And while there still is a silence in the room, I'd like to remind you in the upper foyer, we still have some books for sale, particularly two of the Linda's books, "Conspiracy to Murder," her new book, which is available only in Canada, only at this event, and "A People Betrayed." In that same foyer when we're finished here, after the fourth panel, again I invite you to join us in the upper foyer for a

reception at the end. So now we'll take our coffee break, and if the panelists could please join us at the front.