

Panel 1: Hate Media in Rwanda

Introduction

Allan Thompson: Thank you, thank you again, General Dallaire. So we're now only 45 seconds behind schedule. So we're going to move directly into the first panel. If I could ask the panelists to make their way, and to please watch the giant leap as you get onto the stage. I'm just going to give you a quick sort of preview of how these panels are going to work. I'm delegating the chairperson responsibility to a subject matter expert for each of these panels. In the case of panel number one, Frank Chalk, the Co-director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies will be chairing this panel. We have several speakers, who will each present a brief, 10-minute presentation of their paper. At that point, the discussant for the panel will pose the first couple of questions, then we'll move to questions from the floor. So if we can take a moment while the panelists take their places, and then we will begin. Perhaps if Frank wants to sort of begin introducing the subject while the panelists move into place.

Frank Chalk, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies

Frank Chalk: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. My name is Frank Chalk. I am from the Department of History, Concordia University, and the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. All of you have programs, and I suggested last evening that instead of taking the time to read the biographies in your programs covering the panelists, we save that four or five minutes for the discussion. Each of our speakers will take 10 minutes or 11 minutes, and we will do our utmost to ensure that we have adequate time for you to ask questions, and to hear answers, though I would ask that you keep your questions as brief as possible, and I will also ask the panelists to keep their answers as brief as possible.

General Dallaire left us with many important recommendations. One of them pertains specifically to the young people in this room, and that is to learn the languages, the history, the geography, the sociology of other cultures, other countries so in the future Canadians and other peoples are prepared to understand what they see unfolding before them in the local languages, with an inside knowledge of the cultures that are revealing themselves. This panel is an attempt to address the problem of bringing to the public the expertise of a whole generation of scholars, who studied Rwanda, and worked on the issues in Rwanda, in some cases for their entire professional careers. The biographies are in the program. The expertise is here. The order in which we are going to present the subject is as follows. We'll begin first, with Marcel Kabanda, second Jean-Pierre Chrétien, third Binaifer Nowrojee, thank you Binaifer, and finally Alison Des Forges. This order reflects the subjects that each of the panelists will address, and puts them in approximate chronological order. The first speaker then is Marcel Kabanda. Panelists, I've set my timer for 10 minutes, when you hear it go off, you have one more minute, and I'd ask you to please then conclude.

Marcel Kabanda, UNESCO, Rwandan historian and co-author of *Les Medias du Genocide*

Marcel Kabanda: Good morning. So I have a text, which is rather long, but I'll try not to follow rather what it says in the text, but to summarize somewhat. If it goes too quickly, if it's not understandable, then please indicate to me, and I will adapt accordingly. So you can understand therefore it's difficult for me to speak here, just after General Dallaire. So I'll try nevertheless, between what he says, and what I'll explain to you, I'll try and ensure a certain continuity here. I think what he gave was a very good introduction to the following presentations, which will come. He talked on the basis of his experience as a military man, but he also talked about the media, and the role of the media. And he spoke at length also about foreign media. I myself, I myself, will just talk about the media in Rwanda. He mentioned the role, which could be played by the media in a positive way so as to help to resolve issues, to inform people, and I myself here will focus on the role which the media have played really in a negative way, an adverse way, and as he said really the media are the double-edged sword. In the written media, which affected Rwanda during the 1990s, the best one known, though, is the Newspaper Kangura. It's well known for it's historic hatred of Tutsi, and against Hutu, who expressed their desire for change, for freedom, for democratic openness. It was founded in 1990, and headed from the beginning to the end by Mr. Hassan Ngeze . It became famous soon in the publication in December, 1990, by what was called The Ten Commandants About Hutu, by these ten commandants, it was encouraging Hutu to realize the Tutsi were an enemy first and foremost. To move away from them, to break all links with them, links of marriage, business links, professional links, and to break up the historic, political, cultural community of Rwanda, and to build another one, one which would be more pure apparently, alongside which there would be a different category, which would be tolerable, but nevertheless have to be closely monitored because they wish to dominate. But Kangura is not known simply for making a call to freedom. It was also known by the propaganda over four years so as to ensure the failure of all attempts at mediation or reconciliation, preferring to reconciliation rather the logic of confrontation. This is more than just suggested. It's actually expressed, clearly expressed, that the words associated with this are evoked carefully of violence, which is very serious, and what I regret myself is I didn't conduct a statistical study of the number of times terms, such as "death" and "blood" were used.

Also, through cartoons and caricatures, you can see, that men are dishonored. They're undressed, and they're always shown really in positions, which are really not to their credit. In 1990, Rwanda was at the crossroads. Refugees had lived for 20, 30 years outside, and they were asking to come back. They demanded therefore they put an end to certain practices. Within the country, more and more people were protesting to demand an opening to a multi-party system, the position repatriation of refugees.

There was a feeling of asphyxia within the country, the feeling of abandonment outside also, come together, and they speak out against the hypocrisy of the system, which claims to be republican and democratic, when it, in fact, clearly practices tyranny.

So in answer to the war, and to the request for political openness, the regime reacted by recalling the reaction of 1950, the revolution of 1959. This reference has a dual advantage. It makes it possible therefore to bring the armed opponents, to put them into the category of being simply nostalgic, and it calls on the mobilization of the people, who were called to defend the advantages gained. It also, it could also appeal to the first popular movement in 1963, an episode,

which legitimized violence, and was extreme violence. From 1990-1994, but particularly during 1991, the newspaper Kangura published a number of articles in which it used the Tutsi as a scarecrow to scare people in the world of business, claiming that they were governing, despite the appearance, which was the majority in the school system, both in terms of teachers, and also in terms of students, and also in the church, and everything, which was the symbol of modernity, for example in cities.

So therefore, we're going to focus primarily on all these passages, and some of these articles, which illustrate this movement back to the 1950s and, 60s. You have to recognize that the revolution was legitimized at the beginning by this observation, which was made in what you could call the Bahutu Manifesto of 1957. I'll read the main points of this document to you. "The problem is first and foremost a problem of political monopoly enjoyed by one certain group, the Tutsi". What Kangura was trying to do in 1990 is to try and convince the electorate that the situation still prevails. It was trying to paste the Rwanda society of 1990, he was trying to put on it the image of 1957. It was speaking out against so called hegemony of the Tutsi, where the majority of people were the victims first. It was asking the Hutu to remember the revolution of 1959, and this for him was essential to remain a democracy.

It pointed out that the war conducted by the Tutsi never stopped, and you can read, for example, this in Kangura number six of December, 1990, that since the revolution of 1959, not did one day the Tutsi ever give up the idea of re-conquering power in Rwanda, and exterminating intellectuals and dominating the Bahutu farmers. It suggested that with this process of conquest and revolution, the Tutsi had made considerable advances, and that they were mobilizing the work markets, trade and also finance. And you can read, for example, in November, 1991, the following, "The Bahutu Tutsi can constitute 50 per cent of government officials, 70 per cent of private business employees, 90 per cent of staff in embassies and international organizations, and they occupy important positions everywhere. Nevertheless, they constitute only 10 per cent of the population. Therefore this image was an image of an invading Tutsi, an invasive force."

The same thing applies also in education. He states the following with respect to an education system you can read this in May, 1990, "For as regards to education, the minority remains in leadership."

Another article the same month, but in 1992, suggesting the statistics for education at all levels of secondary education are looked at very carefully, we'll be surprised to see that Tutsi are everywhere. They're present everywhere. Kangura explains the increase of the role of Tutsi in the social and political field of the country through the negligence with which the scoring system was carried out. It criticizes the government for lacking vigilance, and for giving the Tutsi identity cards, indicating in fact that they were Hutu, which made it impossible therefore to control and conduct discrimination. And it says because of the practice of falsification of identity, the policy of balance is a failure, and that's why in the schools the Tutsi, and those who kept that identity constitute now 80 per cent of the staff.

The same practice is also used with respect to political parties. They criticize those people, who try and revive the old party. It accused them of being cowards, opportunists. It builds up again the en diable; it doesn't want to add other things to it. Kangura nevertheless is trying to suggest

to all the Hutu that the best to continue this campaign is the president Habyarimana. I wasn't able to do this, but at least I'll come to the conclusion now.

When you reread this text, we're particularly struck by the interest shown to history, and why Kangura had to remind them of the speeches of 1954, and Joseph Gitara (?) in 1976. In a society where experience is so respected, this is an excellent argument. The past provides the evidence that violence against Tutsi was seen, but we can see nevertheless that throughout the history nevertheless made it possible to improve things for certain people. You could therefore look at the logic and genocide here. This is clearly stated. You identify the Tutsi from within as being accomplices with any action for refugees. Thank you very much.



Jean Pierre Chrétien: CNRS, co-author of Les Medias du Genocide

Frank Chalk: Next I have the honor of presenting the historian, Jean-Pierre Chrétien.

Jean Pierre Chrétien: So good morning. So you can see therefore how difficult it is in 10 minutes to present something that is very important, which is the content of propaganda, which lead to genocide based on texts, on specific realities. Recently the French journalist, Jean Atsfelt(?) in Machete published the evidence of a number of killers, if you will, in genocide, a number of people responsible for genocide. He said killing is very discouraging. If you have yourself to take the decision to do so, but if you have to obey certain orders, the orders of the authorities, if you were sufficiently sensitized, then you feel nevertheless somewhat comforted. You don't worry about it quite so much. We, in fact, were sensitized to this by radio, and by the advice that we received. So this psychology of killers, who are taking part in massacres can be clearly seen, not in an ethnological, ethno-cultural context, but rather in the actual methodology of modern propaganda. And this is very well seen through a manual from a French psychologist, Roger Muchielli entitled "Psychology of the Publicity and Propaganda". It's a handbook for psychologists and for facilitators, etc. And this was published in the beginning of the 70s, and with the all the other works of the specialists, can be found at the University Library of Butare. Alison Des Forges, who is here also with us this morning found a reference established by an intellectual from Butare, which clearly shows the way in which such propaganda can be used in order to promote this ideology, which would lead to genocide. I've referred myself to the Muchielli work. He explains, in fact, that in this case you shouldn't use a moral priority, rather we're taught to use modern technology to condition the masses. You have to create the right awareness with the people you want to mobilize, based on a feeling of indignation, indignation towards an enemy, an enemy which is taken as a scapegoat by using various techniques in order to create this feeling of indignation, and also hatred against this enemy, and also a fascination by the organizers of genocide; with this kind of work. The author himself, of course, is not advocating genocide, but they use his technology. So all the elements were there in Rwanda: low level literacy, a unanimous approach to things, and also a clear, and long existence of scapegoats, potential scapegoats, which had existed for 30 years, namely the Tutsi. So therefore there's a reference here to the Tutsi, the majority. So therefore there's a socioeconomic populism, therefore, basis of preeminence of Hutu people, whose absolute rights are based on their majority nature, and also on the fact that they can also state their supposed indigenous character, in

contrast to the “outside” Tutsi character.

This ideology impregnated all public life in Rwanda since the beginning of the 1960s. And what seems important therefore, to us, in this extremist propaganda, which was developed in 1990s, and which prepared to genocide was the fact that it was rooted, rooted here, well two things; first there was an ideology already, which was they had seen for a generation, and also, and this comes back to this technical work of Muchielli, there was also a reference to the very effectiveness of this kind of argument, because they could disqualify all opponents in order to bring together the mass around a Hutu power movement, the growth of which was therefore promoted. Therefore you have a democratic language that became a kind of technology to mobilize people in the totalitarian way under the cover of freedom of expression.

Now if we take the subjects of the RTLM, given all the programs that they broadcast, we can see that they’re based on a double register, that of racist passion against the Tutsi, and also the feeling of legitimacy on behalf of the majority people. The first register, an ethno-racial one, I won’t talk about that, because we don’t have a lot of time, and everyone is familiar with it. What seems to be important is the second register, which seems really to deserve our attention. That way we can understand where the blindness came from. We can also understand why the propaganda was so effective. The essential reference from the months preceding genocide and during the massacres was therefore that of the majority people. The legitimacy of their self defense against a clique, a feudal clique, so therefore the normalcy of the massacre by the majority as an expression of anger, a democratic anger if you will. If the Hutu which are in our country, 90 per cent, if we can be beaten just by a 10 per cent clique, that means that we really haven’t shown our own true strength. That was May 28, 1994, broadcast on RTLM. That’s exactly what they said. May 14 now, the low size family in Rwanda is that of the Tutsi, the small group that came from abroad. There aren’t too many of them here, maybe just 10 per cent, and this Rwanda belongs to me. I’m in the majority, so Rwanda belongs to me. So therefore this reference of the majority is essential therefore to legitimize massive mobilization, violent mobilization by those people around extremist leaders, and extremists policies, coalition for the defense, and also the Hutu power movement. April 3rd now, a few days before the beginning of the genocide. The real shield is the army. The day when the people rise up. So you can see it’s not very democratic, and they don’t want you any more. That is you the Tutsi, and they hate you so much. They hate you from the bottom of their hearts. You’ll make them feel sick, and I wonder really how you can get out of this. How are you going to escape? You can understand therefore, the systematic massacre of these people became legitimate in their eyes as some of the people therefore interviewed by Jean Hatzfeld stated.

Therefore you see all this propaganda based on this, I’ve got a lot of other quotes also, but I’ve only got 10 minutes so I can’t give them all. Therefore, what we’re talking about here is a collective suicide of Tutsi. They chose to kill themselves, because they’re the minority. Nevertheless, they did try and conduct political action. There’s also a demographic force here, the certainty of victory, and I stress this, a clear, open conscience about this that they were fighting for the people. As the Belgian journalist, Georges Ruggiu, who worked for RTLM, pointed out, they killed about 50 people, said Radio France Internationale. He said this represents only about nine per cent, namely the Tutsi part. That is the proportion of people who, therefore you’d expect this. The historic reference therefore Marcel Kabanda pointed out, what struck me

is historic reference, not just in the past of Rwanda, the social revolution in 1960s, but also the reference to the French Revolution even. Robespierre they quoted. Didn't Robespierre in France do the same thing? When he heard that on June 30 on RTL. Or, you can compare the players here with the landings in Normandy in 1944. There were comparisons made with them in D-Day.

So what I want to point out here is this works, this approach in Rwanda. For some time really, it's repeated abroad. It comforts people with their normal prejudices, which exist, for example in France or even in Belgium, and so in Christian democratic circles, where they can easily have an ethnic interpretation of these things, and interpret this in a democratic way as the majority are holding power. In the 1990s, for example, this was presented clearly as being a democratic power, since the press had represented the ethnic majority.

They also could mention Georges Ruggiu biography, which I mentioned earlier. Georges Ruggiu, he wasn't a perpetrator of genocide. He was a young third world leader. He compared Rwanda with the favelas in Brazil, the slums of Brazil. But he also met militant students, Rwandan students in Belgium. He accepted their ideas of democracy, and rule by the majority. The Arusha Agreements therefore betrayed the people in his view. Therefore his populist convictions were almost naturally linked with the racial ideology, which was maintained by the extremists, and we also have to mention the western press here. On a number of occasions they said, I myself, for example, have seen in the French press in May and June in *Le Monde*, *Liberation*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, I saw articles, where this ideology, this populist ideology, was stated. I think the blindness in our own countries about the nature of genocide, Dr. Beaverson (sic) of *Medecins Sans frontieres*, said on July 15, 1994, "neither France nor the international community, in fact, acquired the means to characterize the genocide, to understand what it was, and to understand the consequences of it." I myself often quote a statement by Alfred Grosser, author of *Le Crime et la Memoire*, "No it's not true, that a massacre of Africans is felt in the same way as a massacre of Europeans." There are three reasons for this; first the difference mentioned by General Dallaire, also, the kind of ethnographic screen here, which we have that appears, and I've probably mention all of this, and also the fact that genocide is seen as really being as a large mobilization, a democratic mobilization.



Binaifer Nowrojee. Harvard Law School, author of Shattered Lives

Frank Chalk: Excellent, thank you very much. Our third speaker, Binaifer Nowrojee, will now present.

Binaifer Nowrojee: My name is Binaifer Nowrojee. I work with Human Rights Watch. Recently, Romeo Dallaire testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and one of the questions that he was asked by the prosecutor's office, was a question about what he noticed about the female corpses during the genocide. To which he responded, that young girls, young women, would be laid out, with their dresses over their heads, the legs spread and bent. You could see what seemed to be semen, drying or dried and it all indicated to me that these women were raped. And then, a variety of materials were crushed or implanted into their vagina, their breasts were cut off, and the faces were, in many cases, still.

In many cases still the eyes were open, and there was like a face that seemed horrified, or something. They all laid on their backs. I would say generally at the sites, you could find younger girls and young women, who had been raped. Dallaire's aide, Brent Beardsley, who also testified recently, was asked the same question, and his response in court was to say he had noticed two characteristics about the female corpses; one, when they killed women, it appeared that the blows that killed them were aimed at sexual organs, either breasts or vagina. They had been deliberately swiped or slashed in those areas. And secondly, there was a great deal of what we came to believe was rape, where the women's bodies or clothes would be ripped off their bodies. They would be lying back in a back position, their legs spread, especially in the case of very young girls. I'm talking girls as young as six, seven years of age. Their vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously multiple gang rape, and then, they would have been killed in that position. So they were lying in the position that they had been raped.

Rape was one of the hardest things to deal with in Rwanda on our part. It deeply affected every one of us. We had a habit at night of coming back to the headquarters, and after the activities had slowed down for the night, before we went to bed, sitting around talking about what had happened that day, drinking coffee, having a chat, and among all of us, the hardest thing that we had to deal with was not so much the bodies of people, the murder of people. I know that can sound bad, but that wasn't as bad to us as the rape, and especially systematic rape and gang rape of children. Massacres kill the body. Rape kills the soul, and there was a lot of rape. It seemed that everywhere we went from the period of 19th of April until the time we left, there was rape everywhere near those killing sites.

The sexual violence that took place during the Rwandan genocide was not some sort of random, opportunistic, unfortunate byproduct of the genocide. This was a tactic of genocide. This was a deliberately selected form of abuse that was directed at women, both on the basis of their gender, and also in the case of Tutsi women, on the basis of their ethnicity. And this form of violence didn't just pop up out of nowhere. If you look at the genocide propaganda that preceded the Rwandan genocide, and you look at the role of the Rwandan media in portraying images of women, particularly Tutsi women, you

will see in that propaganda, portrayal of women, Tutsi women, as being beautiful, sexual, seductresses, but devious, using their sexuality in order to undermine the Hutu, in order to perpetuate a Tutsi agenda.

The print media, Kangura, depicted vile cartoons of Tutsi women using their sexual prowess on UN peacekeepers, or using their beauty in order to undermine the Hutu community. Kangura warned Hutus, “be on guard against Tutsi women.” The Ten Commandments of the Hutu, which laid out rules for what should be done; four of those mentioned women, Tutsi women, and how you have to be careful of them. And so not surprisingly when the violence began, the violence directed at the Tutsi women was sexual violence. Rape served to degrade and destroy Tutsi women, and the effect of the media propaganda is seen very readily when you begin to interview rape victims in Rwanda. The comments that were made to them in the course of the sexual violence, the ethnic invectives used as they were being raped, mirror exactly the depiction of these women in the gender propaganda that was put out before the genocide. There’s a correlation between the hate propaganda that was put out, both by print media, Kangura, and also then replicated on the airwaves with the RTLM, and then the subsequent acts of violence again women.

And so now post genocide, what justice can we offer to these women, who have had genocide crimes committed against them, specifically directed at their gender. And here the International Criminal Tribunal can play a role, and unfortunately, there’s been very little justice for Rwandan women out of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for many reasons, and there’s no time to go into that here. But what I do want to just point out is that in the media judgment that came out, there was a paragraph that did mention gender violence, and I think it’s an important paragraph. I’m just going to read it so you have a sense, because I think it provides some way to begin to build on this, and to begin to provide justice to women. This is a starting point.

In the media judgment that the Rwanda tribunal gave out, I quote here, “the Chamber notes that Tutsi women, in particular, were targeted for persecution. The portrayal of the Tutsi woman as a femme fatale, and the message that Tutsi women were seductive agents of the enemy, was conveyed repeatedly by RTLM, the radio, and Kangura, the print. The Ten Commandments broadcast on RTLM and published in Kangura, vilified and endangered Tutsi women. By defining the Tutsi women as an enemy in this way, RTLM and Kangura articulated a framework, that made the sexual attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to them.” Now those words, “foreseeable consequence,” are extremely important words, because now as the International Tribunal moves forward in looking at cases of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the genocide, and that is four trials: two government trials, and two military trials, these are people who are going to be held responsible for their acts by command responsibility. They themselves are not rapists, but they were responsible. This language in the media judgment, and the words “foreseeable consequence,” allow us now to begin to build on that to make the links to command responsibility, and ultimately hopefully to bring some justice to women, and it is my hope that the tribunal will rectify it’s shameful record that

it had on the prosecution of gender crimes, and use this judgment as a starting point to bring justice to Rwandan women. Thank you.



Alison Des Forges, Senior Advisor, Human Rights Watch, author of *Leave None to Tell the Story*

Frank Chalk: Alison Des Forges is our final panelist.

Alison Des Forges: Thank you very much. We've heard a little bit this morning about what the media was saying, and we will hear more, I believe, as the day goes along, of the specific language so that you can understand, and get a sense of the flavour of what was really happening. It was clear to Rwandans themselves long before the start of the genocide, that the media was being used to incite violence, and in the Arusha Accords, which were the peace settlement, there was indeed, a specific provision against the continuation of incitement to violence through propaganda. This was, of course, not observed any more than other parts of the Arusha Accords.

The Minister of Information of the Rwandan government also attempted to call RTLM to order. So we can see that the people understood before the start, that the media had already played a role, and could be expected to continue playing a role. The print media was important before April 6, but after April 6, we're really talking about the radio, and this is because Kangura stopped publishing, regularly at least, after April 6.

As has already been said, the radio was the voice of authority. It was taken as a way of giving directions to the population. It served essentially three purposes during the genocide. First of all, incitement, and we'll hear some examples of the clear language, the clear call for violence against Tutsi, and against Hutu whose ideas were opposed to those of the genocide. There were also examples of specific orders given, persons identified by name, and their location given. This goes beyond incitement. This is a clear part of the communications of the genocidal campaign, and goes a step beyond what incitement could be. There was one case, for example, about which I collected testimony, of a man whose children were specifically named on the radio, and the announcer, Valerie Bemeriki said over RTLM, "There's a vehicle approaching the barrier at the Lycee de Citeaux in central Kigali, and inside, there's a family of cockroaches. Stop them!" And half an hour later, she came on the air to congratulate the people at the barrier, because they had stopped them, and gotten rid of them. This so far beyond any exercise of free speech that it is patently clear.

There was a third function for the radio, and it links into what Professor Chrétien was talking about, and that is the question of legitimacy. People obviously found it easier to go against all morality and all law, because they were told, by what was purportedly their legitimate government, that this was what they should do, what they had to do, and that they would be punished for not doing it.

Now, the argument that people needed to kill their neighbors in order to protect themselves, that this was a form of self-defense, that kind of argument gained force, because there was no international condemnation of it. The government was able to continue presenting itself as legitimate, because it's representative continued to sit on the Security Council. By an accident of history, Rwanda was one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, and it continued to sit there. It's delegation was seated at the Organization of African Unity. It's representatives were received in Paris, and in Cairo. So that it could continue to present itself to the people as legitimate, and it's exercise in genocide as being a form of self-defense that was understood and accepted by the rest of the world.

Jamming the radio would have had three important effects. First of all, it would have stopped incitement. Second of all, it would have interrupted those specific orders and communications. And third of all, it would have called into question the legitimacy of the government. This is because the right to broadcast within a country is, indeed, as General Dallaire mentioned, an aspect of it's sovereignty, guaranteed by international treaty. Were an outside power, either a national government or an international organization, to intervene, and to stop those broadcasts, it would be, in fact, a demonstration that it no longer accepted the sovereignty and legitimacy of that government. This would have sent a powerful signal to Rwandans in a way that nothing else could have.

We can see the importance of that kind of action because once, in fact, there was a response elsewhere in the world, once you began to get criticisms from the secretary general, from the Pope, from various national leaders, when those began to come over the radio waves on BBC, Voice of America, Air FE, the authorities felt a need to counter them, and so you then get a series of broadcasts on RTLM reassuring the population, and saying, "never mind, never mind. Don't worry about what they're saying. Don't worry what is going on at Geneva, at the UN Human Rights Commission. All of that will be forgotten. They did nothing about the killers in Burundi. They did nothing about the killers in other parts of the world, and they will do nothing about you as long as you win the war." So you can see, and we know from the minutes of meetings of local communal security committees that they were listening to these radio broadcasts, and that they were acutely aware of what was being said in the international community.

So, given all of that, those of us who were following the situation at the time, and I as a representative of Human Rights Watch was actively involved at the time. Why didn't we do something? Well, we tried, and what we tried to do was to get the radio jammed, and our argument was, we understood that after Somalia, it was going to be very difficult to get a military intervention. But jamming the radio seemed to be relatively cheap, effective, and could be done without using ground forces. It could be done from the air. We went with that argument to Washington. We went to the UN. We took it to France, because those were the three places, where there was some realistic possibility they had the technology, and they had the means to intervene, but as we see from what General Dallaire said, the UN until late June refused to even speak out about the radio. It was only in June that the Security Council made a statement. In France, of course, the reaction was understandable, because the French government was in effect closely supporting the

government that was carrying out genocide, but in the U.S., let's talk for a minute about that. We were able to have access to the White House, to Anthony Lake, who was the National Security Advisor to President Clinton, and we made the plea for jamming the radio, and we know that in early May, he sent a request to the Secretary of Defense to investigate jamming the radio. In early June, some of the senators, Senator Kennedy, in particular, Senator Simon, again reiterated this request to the Pentagon and to the Department of State. The answer was no, and the answer was given in three parts. First of all, freedom of expression. The United States is a country that is committed to freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of expression. This, of course, totally ignored the fact that there was precedent in U.S. law for prohibition and punishment of direct incitement to violence if it then would produce violence. But that argument was not given weight.

The second argument was the sovereignty one, and the third argument was logistically, and military and financial. It would cost \$8,000 an hour for the airplane to do the jamming. And the calculations that they did based on that assumed the need for sort of 24-hour coverage all the time, which wouldn't have been necessary. A fairly brief and sporadic interruption would have sent the message.

In the end, there was another reason, of course. These three reasons they gave us were nothing but pretexts. There was a more fundamental reason, and that was that jamming the radio would have been a clear first step. It would have meant acknowledging what was going on, that there was, in fact, a genocide, and that that required breaking international treaty, violating freedom of speech guarantees, and spending the money, because genocide was more important than any of the rest. And the problem with that was, if it didn't work, if it wasn't enough, you would have already taken a step down the path, and you couldn't go back. You would have then had to take more steps, put in more resources, potentially even commit soldiers, because once you had made clear it was genocide, you couldn't any longer pretend the issue was of no importance, and that was fundamentally the reason that nothing was done.

After the genocide was finished, and the new government was in power, the U.S., France and the UN all changed their policies, and took certain measures to jam the radio, because they had different interests, and the radio then was attempting to stop the return of refugees back to Rwanda, and these authorities wanted the refugees to return, and so they then adopted measures, which made jamming of the radio possible.

Now, I'd just like to throw out one question for us to think about as the day goes on, and that is, the Rwandan case was the simplest, the clearest, the most morally simple case you can imagine. But, we cannot assume that the next time will be so clear. We have talked about putting aside national sovereignty and intervening, and of course, the Canadians have lead the way with their commission on looking at the responsibility to protect, but this is a very complex question. Who is to decide when intervention is appropriate? Would you like that decision made in Washington? I wouldn't. Who is to decide when it is time to intervene? That's the problem we all face. Thank you.

Question Period

Frank Chalk: I want to thank the panelists for respecting the time available for their presentation. I felt a little bit, if Martin Amos will forgive me, like Times arrow, striking them down one after another, but actually they helped a lot, and I hope you can help us a lot also by making your questions concise, and as I said earlier, the panelists will try to do the same. I think it would be useful if we took four questions, or we heard four questions first, and then gave the four individuals to whom you address your questions an opportunity to answer them. That way we'll get questions on the floor. We can be thinking about them a little bit ahead of time, and by grouping them that way, we might even have a chance for a second round. So I will ask you, I'm sorry, thank you, I'm sorry, I forgot. Please excuse me, I've overlooked an important step, because I didn't look to my left. I only looked to my right. We have a discussant, who is going to begin by posing two questions for us, or raising two issues for us, I believe. Please go ahead.

Mary Kimani, Internews Rwanda: You're forgiven.

Frank Chalk: Very kind.

Mary Kimani: I want to start by basically trying to put this, for me it has always been a bit hard to understand how media could have played such an important role in what happened. And I want to pose a question to the panel is I've always asked myself, and maybe people here have also asked themselves, how is it that two private media organizations, because we've spoken largely of Kangura and RTL, how could it have been that two private organizations could have had so much of an impact? Was there a culture in Rwanda at the time in the media that supported their efforts? Were there other media organizations that, kind of, broadcast the same, or printed the same kind of articles? Were there people who were countering what they were writing, and why didn't not work? If you could explain to us, maybe the history of the Rwandan media, in brief, and how it helped Kangura and RTL to become so important in what happened in 1994?

Frank Chalk: Who would like to address that question? We can start. Alison?

Alison Des Forges: Well I would say simply that the efforts of these private organizations were echoed by the official structure. The persons who were the investors and the organizers of these private media were, in fact, themselves, major authorities in the political system. They were passing by the private route in order to disguise what they were doing, but everyone knew who was involved, and who was behind it, and it was that which gave a deal of force to what was said. In addition, the radios, for example, RTL at one point said that they estimated they reached 75 per cent of the households of Rwanda at the height of their power. And people listened to the radio all the time, and people who didn't have radios went to someone else's house to listen to the radio. I remember one witness describing how in part of Rwanda, it was difficult to receive RTL, and so he had to climb up on the roof of his house in order to get a clear signal, and he would stand up there on the roof of his house with his radio to his ear listening to

it, and then shouting out to the crowd what was being said, and it's for me this image of the relay from the radio to a person of standing in the community, someone of importance, who then relays the message. This was so clear that in those parts of the country, and we haven't talked about this yet, but there were parts of the country, where people refused, where people opposed the genocide for several weeks. And in some of those parts of the country, one of the measures taken by the authorities was to direct the population not to listen to the radio. So there is a clear measure of its power.

Frank Chalk: Professor Chrétien will also comment.

Professor Chrétien: As was clearly pointed out by Alison Des Forges, they're private run official organizations at arms length from the government. So if I could add something to the answer, there's a source which enables us to identify those responsibilities in democratic press, in the opposition press, where there is criticism about the media, and also in certain initiatives taken by the national union governments. So it wasn't just on the outside that retrospectively there's criticism here of what happened. The criticism came from inside also and at the time.

Mary Kimani: I have a question that would be obviously with Kangura operating from 1990-1994, and publishing cartoons, and publishing The Ten Commandants, and other inflammatory articles, there was clear evidence that you were moving towards a certain trend, and it was not only Kangura. There were other magazines like the Interahamwe. So why did we have to wait until 1994 to do something about incitement in Rwanda? Could there have been anything done before, so that by the time RTLM is coming into the play, people have doubtful attitudes, or questioning attitudes towards the media?

Frank Chalk: Okay Marcel.

Marcel Kabanda: I must say that when Kangura stopped in 1994, it wasn't following a decision, a decision against Kangura. Kangura stopped in '94. The last issue appeared in March, '94, and after April and May, it didn't appear again, and this was no doubt because the conditions of war didn't make it possible to publish. There weren't actually measures taken in order to prevent it from operating. Now the attempts therefore to stop the operation of Kangura, as was pointed out earlier by Jean Chrétien in answer to your earlier question, in other words, were there attempts to prevent it from operating? Yes, with respect to Kangura also in July, 1990, that is two months after it appeared for the first time, Mr. Ngeze was the subject of a trial. He was arrested and put in prison. What's rather paradoxical about this, is that at the time he was discharged for incitement to ethnic division, that was the charge, incitement to ethnic division. The Rwanda government at the time, or at least the Department of Justice was very aware at the time of the risks, of the dangers posed by something like Kangura for the balance, the equilibrium of Rwanda society. So what's paradoxical, it was the Human Rights Organizations, such as Amnesty International, intervened in order to have him released on behalf of the principle of freedom of expression, and when he came out of prison, when he was released, the first issues which came out after that, issues 5 and 6, in which, in fact, you do see the Ten Commandants of the Hutu in issue number 6. So whenever attempts were made, but these

attempts failed, either because of the principle of freedom of expression, or also because of the operation of Kangura really interested the politicians in Rwanda, who didn't want to see it disappear.

Frank Chalk: I want to remind everybody that our session concludes at 15 minutes past 11:00 so we can have a coffee break and time for the second morning session. So, I would like to hear four questions posed from the floor, perhaps one each for each of the panelists. That would be very nice if possible. Please when you stand up, tell us your name, and to whom your question is addressed. It would help if your questions were focused, and not addressed to the entire panel. So let's hear the four questions, and the panelists will note your questions, and I will too, and we'll try and deal with them in order. The gentleman, who looks like Steve Livingston at the mic on my left to begin. Yes.

Steve Livingston: It is Steve Livingston thank you. This is an invitation to Alison to expand on her last question actually, and as I understood it, the question is, who decides when an intervention into hate radio is appropriate? I think that that question needs to be contextualized. We need to recall that, for instance, in a number of instances since then, there have been interventions against media that were, in the view of the Americans, propagating hate. I would call our attention to Serbia in April, 1999, during the Kosovo War, when Serbian State Television was bombed, in Afghanistan in 2001, when Aljazeera offices were mysteriously bombed, presumably by mistake. Aljazeera, of course, was attacked again in the most recent war. There are a number of instances where media have intervened in a violent way. Who decides? And we need to remember how controversial it is when nations, such as the United States decide to take matters into their own hands, and intervene in the manner in which they do. I would invite you then in my question to expand on your very provocative, and I think, important question. Thank you.

Frank Chalk: Thank you. The questioner on my right, who looks strikingly like Sara.

Sara McKinnon: (sic) My name is Sara McKinnon. This is my professor in history of genocide since 1933 at Concordia University, which is why I'm here. And my question is for Binaifer. I was wondering if as scholars of the Rwandan case, have we learned anything about individual people's turning points from when you hear and see images, and hear certain messages coming at you, when does that turn into action, when average, normal, presumably decent people like us will commit horrible crimes against their neighbors and their families?

Frank Chalk: Thank you, and the third questioner.

Wangui Kimartin: (sic) Hi my name Wangui Kimartin, and I'm just a student at Carleton. I just have a question for Binaifer. You said what justice is there for the women of Rwanda, but I'm not sure what, I mean, what can be done. So I would just ask you to elaborate what justice you would provide that there is for the women of Rwanda, who were raped during the genocide?

Frank Chalk: Okay, and our fourth questioner, is there anybody, yes.

?: My question is for Alison. In numerous accounts of the Rwandan genocide, I've read about the role of the media, especially RTLM in fostering ideas of genocide among the Rwandese people, but there's also mention of a rebel-operated radio station. However, there's nothing about it's contents. Could you expand on that please?

Frank Chalk: Did you get that?

Alison Des Forges: Yes.

Frank Chalk: Okay.

Alison Des Forges: Are we going to ...

Frank Chalk: I think we can go right now into, but let's, so you'll begin with Steve's question.

Alison Des Forges: Actually I'm going to dodge Steve's question, because we do have a panel devoted to that this afternoon. So I'm looking for answers myself. I have very few answers to provide on that issue, but I'm looking forward to the chance to hear the opinion of others on it, and yeah, let's save that one for this afternoon if we can.

On the question, the final question asked about Radio Muhabura, which was the radio of the RPF, and indeed, it is accurate that there have been allegations that Radio Muhabura also promoted racial hatred and fear, not incitement to genocide certainly, but that it promoted an atmosphere that called for violence. We don't have the same reservoir of information about Muhabura unfortunately. The texts that I have consulted so far suggest more of a anti-ethicist nationalism, anti-Habyarimana to be sure, but not of the same nature as RTLM. Let me remind you that the ideology of the RPF has been based upon sort of a 1970s revolutionary nationalist ideology, and because of that it is a movement, which defines itself as anti-ethnic and nationalist, and calls itself a family in which everyone has a part. I stress that this is an ideological statement, not necessarily a reality, and that I do not subscribe to it. I'm simply telling you that because this is their ideology, it is not surprising to find that their broadcasts go in that same direction, and that, indeed, during the genocide they went so far as to invite Interahamwe, the militia, the genocidal militia, to cross the lines and join them, which some did. So rather than attempting to exclude, they were attempting to enlarge their base, and include as many as possible.

Frank Chalk: Thank you, and Binaifer would you answer the question regarding research that has been done about key turning points, and the thinking of those who participated?

Binaifer Nowrojee: Sure, I was actually going to roll both questions in, does that make sense? Okay, on the issue of turning point, I think all of us who work in human rights ask ourselves that question, you know at what point do you, does the fear of our differences

make us overcome the commonality of our humanity to do such terrible things to each other, and in each place, and each trigger point is different. I mean I've lived in the United States for a long time, and for me I've watched very closely these last two years, and watching the turning point in the United States, where you see a climate of fear being propagated, our access to information restricted, and that idea of differences and threats of the other become that become this unnamed other, that you see it. You see how quickly a society turns to embrace that fear, and to accept so unquestioningly stereotypes from authorities, and so I feel you know, the Rwandan lesson is a lesson for all of us. I see no difference in the patterns that lead to the Rwandan genocide as I do to the post-September 11th paranoia and anti-Muslim sentiment that you see in the United States. So I feel it's something that all of us as thinking people have to ensure that our commonalities overcome our differences ultimately.

Going to the issue of justice for women, what justice can there be? I mean, of course, this is Rwanda, so nothing is ever simple, not for justice for perpetrators, or justice for victims, let alone rape victims, but I think that, I mean, I see, I spent some time last year in Rwanda interviewing rape victims to get their sense of what they perceived as being justice, and also their views on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, because as international lawyers we all celebrate this as such a great achievement forward, and I wanted to see from the perspective of a rape victim what the Tribunal looked like. And you know even, obviously the responses were as expected you know, frustration, anger, disappointment, a sense that the tribunal has not delivered justice, but at the same time some sort of unburning desire for it. This idea that still, still, rape victims were looking to the Tribunal for something that deep within us there is that need for public acknowledgement that a wrong was done against us, and you know, the frustration and the anger at the Tribunal really stems from the deep disappointment that it has not delivered. And I think that justice for women can be delivered in two fronts. I think it can be delivered through the law, meaning that the cases should include rape charges. They should be adequately investigated. They should be properly prosecuted, and they should be properly convicted. But I also think that justice has to be a process as well. If we do injustice through the process of delivering justice, we are doing a disservice to genocide victims, and again, the Tribunal has fallen short here. The process is not conducive to getting rape victims to testify, not at the investigative level in terms of interviewing methodology, not in the courtroom in terms of enabling courtroom environment, where in one particularly egregious incident judges burst out laughing while the rape victim was in testimony, and then ultimately in ensuring that these women have information, that they're not just cogs in a wheel. We're not promoting international justice on the backs of genocide victims but that this is a process for them, that we empower them, that we restore their dignity through the process, and we go back and we tell them what has happened once there is a conviction or not a conviction. Thank you.

Frank Chalk: Thank you very. Jean-Pierre Chrétien.

Jean-Pierre Chrétien: Oui.

Just very briefly therefore on the question of Radio Muhabura. I should take this

opportunity also to remind you also of this book on Rwanda. This came out in 2003, and the question is actually addressed, I don't remember the actual page reference, but they do deal with it there. So here we have an interpretation of genocide, the context of which, the responsibilities of which are multiple. Therefore we have to analyze the practices and the content very carefully, without actually trying to balance things out, but at the same time nevertheless quoting the various partners, the various people involved. There was a mission in Kigali in September, 1994, and then there we questioned Bece Bosoma (?), who was an important activist for human rights in Rwanda. And we asked him a question, because we had recordings, we were starting to get recordings of RTLM, but we didn't have any of Radio Muhabura. And he said to us essentially, Radio Muhabura called people to fight against the logic of Hutu power, against the regime. It called on the military to desert, therefore this was part of a civil war logic. But he added also, you won't find there ethnic or racial hatred, unlike RTLM. It's different from RTLM. A number of us recorded that conversation with the gentleman concerned. It's not that much I know. We have to get more evidence. Alison Des Forges reminded us of the ambiguities of the RPF ideology, but you can't deal with a problem only on specific cause sources. But the level of racism in RTLM, this has clearly been documented, so really we can't say the two are the same here.

Frank Chalk: ... and an answer. Yes.

Villia Jeferomous, Queen's University: Villia Jeferomous, Queen's University. I'm interested in a bigger issue, the issue of language and legitimacy that all of you have raised, and I think that it is very powerful and important. The language of the RTLM, and all these kinds of media was the one of legitimacy for a majority, which needed to redress wrongs and protect itself. Let's think now about the current situation in Rwanda and Burundi, and look at the way in which the language is now being used that the minority requires protection, and needs to have its wrongs redressed, and the way in which we have, in fact, international debates on the question of whether or not democracy is the way to go in these countries. Thank you.

Frank Chalk: Okay, who would like to speak to the contemporary situation in Rwanda and Burundi in respect to the demand for adherence to the rights of minorities? Raise your hand if you would like to comment on that. So I know panelists, anybody? Yeah, Marcel.

Marcel Kabanda: The request for the minority to be protected is quite different therefore from the request for elimination of groups. Therefore it's a discussion, it is a mute point. We can discuss it. You might not accept it, but we're speaking out against, what we're speaking out against here is when this language seeks to legitimize, seeks to refuse the possibility of living together, and propose the elimination of a certain group, that the request to, or the demand to protect a minority maybe in a legal framework that you can deal with this in a constitutional framework, but this should not imply a logic of elimination of the minority. That's all I want to say on this.

Frank Chalk: Okay, a word from Jean-Pierre Chrétien ...

Jean-Pierre Chrétien: Well just one word then, well we have to act quickly. It's a question of Rwanda, with a whole history of Rwanda, which you're dealing with here, that is, how can you summarize a tearing apart of society, which was just a prolonged time, and was so torn apart that we really have to consider whether Hutu and Tutsi could really as Rwandans come together again, or as people of Burundi. So the whole problem here is the trap created by genocide, by violence is dreadful, and therefore you can't avoid compromises. If you look at what's going on in Burundi at the present time, you need arrangements. But it's clear that the democracy in the sense in which we understand it, is also a democracy where there are multiple identities, where not everything can be reduced to the fact that you're a Hutu or a Tutsi. So therefore we have to go beyond democracy, but pending that, we have to have arrangements, compromises, we'll begin talk about majority and minority, but it's because of the trap in which those two countries have fallen. Merci.

Frank Chalk: Thank you so much to make this a fruitful panel.

Allan Thompson: Could I just have your attention for 30 seconds. This is going to happen in each panel. This has been an excellent beginning. This is working despite the compressed timeframe. I think inevitably we're going to have people at the microphones at the end of each question period, and what I'm going to suggest, we have a lot of student volunteers, who are journalists, or journalism students. So those who have reached the microphone, and haven't been able to pose their question, please stay there for just a moment. I'm going to have volunteers come, ask you to please give them your question. Tell them who you would like the question to be directed to, and give us a contact, and we will enter these questions into the proceedings of the conference. We'll also relay your questions to the panelists. They can reply to you later, and we'll incorporate this material into the proceedings of the day. So now we'll have our coffee break, and we will return at 11:30 sharp. We will begin. Thank you.